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POPULAR UNDERSTANDING of the attack on Pearl Harbor will
undoubtedly be colored by the release of the $135 million epic Pearl
Harbor, the fifth most expensive film in movie history. Described as
"an adventure/romance in which everything blows up at the end,"
Disney's Touchstone Pictures recreated the December 7, 1941 Japa-
nese attack on the U.S. Navy as its visual climax with an impressive
array of special effects. During the film's production, Honolulu Star-
Bulletin journalist Burl Burlingame was already at work enumerating
the movie's technological inaccuracies and shortcomings.1 In a sec-
ond article which focused on the film's portrayal of race, Burlingame
noted that originally the producers, executives, and director of Pearl
Harbor said they would spare no expense in accurately portraying the
attack—even obtaining the approval of veterans groups. During the
filming, however, producer Jerry Bruckheimer "waffled mightily on
the subject of accuracy," recharacterizing his project as "gee-whiz-it's-
just-entertainment."2 With the film's release on Memorial Day of
2001, a new generation's perception of the attack will likely forever be
influenced by the images and impressions engendered by the film.
Also influential, however, have been the two films used to orient
the more than one million visitors a year to the USS Arizona Memo-
rial, administered by the National Park Service (NPS) on the Pearl
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Harbor Naval Base. This article will focus on how both films have rep-
resented the attack, its origins, and outcomes. While less dramatic
than their Hollywood counterparts, the two films nonetheless demon-
strate the creation and manipulation of collective memory as much as
more commercial products. Particularly telling is the way the accounts
differ from one another. The first film was produced in 1980 by the
United States Navy; the second was produced in 1991—92 by the NPS
in association with Lance Bird of the American Studies Film Center
in New York. Together they represent official, public memory in both
its military and civilian guises. The following analysis of the films,
based on nine months of ethnographic research conducted at the Ari-
zona Memorial in 1994, is presented in terms of content (what is or is
not told), style (the techniques used to relate the story), and impact
(audience reaction).
These official versions will then be compared to the personal mem-
ories of residents who survived the attack, as recorded by the Univer-
sity of Hawai'i's Center for Oral History in its five-volume series, An
Era of Change: Oral Histories of Civilians in World War II Hawai'i.3 Here,
I will focus on how private recollections support or contradict the
official film versions and with what result. I will demonstrate that the
identity of the storyteller (whether institutional or individual) figures
prominently in the selection of facts used to convey the story and, con-
sequently, in the stories' impact on the listener—even in instances
where storylines and context are virtually identical, as they are in the
film versions. However, the narratives are not always what one might
predict based on the presenter's identity; and what is omitted from
an account is often more telling than what is explicitly stated. While
some see this "amnesia" as a characteristically American means of
depoliticizing the past,4 in the case of Pearl Harbor one can hardly tell
the story without assigning, or at least implying, responsibility for what
was the greatest Naval disaster in U.S. history. Clearly, these accounts
of Pearl Harbor reflect not just multiple perspectives but active inter-
ests at work, determining what, in the storyteller's judgment, should
be recalled and publicly remembered and what is better left unspo-
ken, unshared, and unrecorded.
While both the Navy and the NPS films convey a good deal of infor-
mation, the time constraints of the interpretive program and the lack
of audience expertise on the subject combine to limit what is pre-
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sented to a descriptive account of the attack and what triggered it.
This is especially the case with the NPS film since the site's interpre-
tive mission is limited to the attack and its immediate aftermath; i.e.,
World War II battles (much less Hiroshima) are perforce excluded.
The choice of material conveyed by the films is obviously crucial to
audience comprehension and interpretation of the event. What the
oral histories provide (often as told by the children of those who were
adults in 1941) is information on what the attack, its anticipation,
and its aftermath cost residents who lived through it. Their stories are
of job loss, confiscation of goods and property, shortages, martial law,
disruption of lives, and fear. One realizes that, for many, fear existed
long before the attack, it was not generated solely by Japanese mili-
tary action, and it continues to be present to the degree that it pre-
cludes open discussion of the past.
In evaluating the gaps and variations found in these narratives, I
address the need to explore not only the sources and consequences
of official historical "ignore-ance"5 but of communal silence as well.
For the most striking aspect of this study is surely not that memory of
even the most dramatic episodes fades or that it works selectively to
further political interests. Rather, it is that so many survivors deliber-
ately drew a curtain of silence over their wartime experience, thereby
allowing the story to be told, publicly unchallenged, by those with per-
spectives greatly at variance with their own. In my conclusion, I inves-
tigate the purpose that such silence serves.
THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE: THE NAVY FILM
One might begin by asking why the Navy film (1980) is included in
the comparison since it has not been screened since 1992, the date it
was officially "retired." The answer is simple: millions of people saw it
over the eleven years it was shown at the USS Arizona Memorial, they
remember it, and they allude to it in evaluating its successor. More
than that, however, the attitudes displayed in the film continue to be
expressed by the Navy, as exemplified by the formal remarks made by
Admiral Henry Chiles at the 1995 Naval observance of the Pearl Har-
bor attack: "It's a powerful reminder that we need to always be strong
militarily and vigilant in our life as a country. We must not be caught
off guard again."
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The film's opening scene is also the most memorable, judging by
the comments of visitors who have seen both the Navy and the
National Park Service films. Viewers frequently make mention of how
much they liked (and miss) this scene, in which the names of the men
who died on the Arizona are whispered while the camera pans over the
ship's sunken hull. It produces a somewhat eerie, ghost-like effect.
The music heard in the background and used intermittently at the
beginning of the film and again at the end conveys a sense of fore-
boding. Hearing it, the audience is reminded of the ship's ultimate
fate as the film progresses with footage illustrating the Arizona's ser-
vice history. The wavy effect used as a transition device also functions
as an allusion to the underwater grave of the Arizona. It enables the
audience to assume the perspective of the submerged ship, looking
up through the rippling water while peering into the past. The poetic
effect is in sharp contrast to the crisp, condensed prose akin to a
ship's log which is used to describe the Arizona's service record. It cul-
minates with the vessel's assignment to Pearl Harbor the summer of
1941. The description of the site gives no indication that it was any-
thing but a military installation; i.e., no mention is made of the civil-
ian population of Hawai'i.
The scene then shifts to Asia. A litany of Japanese military cam-
paigns is recited, beginning with Manchuria and ending with Singa-
pore. The description of U.S. reaction to the hostility is noteworthy.
There is little mention of diplomatic activity or warnings until the
events of December 7 are recounted. By then, it was too late: Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull are shown meet-
ing with ambassadors in Washington, D.C. after Japanese planes were
already airborne. The sole note that the U.S. was alert to danger is
couched in terms of military preparedness: "Yet the U.S. did prepare
in some ways. Congress provided for replacement of obsolete Navy
ships." Otherwise, the film continues, "As an isolationist nation, the
United States hoped the whole business would go away."
If the civilian branch of the American government does not come
across as alert or effective, the Japanese military certainly does. In fact,
the Navy film recognizes the professionalism of Japanese forces so
explicitly that its assessment has generated more negative feedback
from American audiences than anything else appearing in the film
or at the site in general. Specifically, the film states that the Japanese
operation was "one of the most brilliantly planned and executed naval
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attacks in history." Further, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-
in-Chief of the combined Japanese fleet, is characterized as a "bril-
liant strategist."6 Former military officers employed as rangers at the
memorial recognize the objective accuracy of these statements (the
very success of the attack would seem to warrant such a conclusion),
while understanding Americans' sensitivity on the subject. (The cur-
rent film refrains from passing judgment.7) To further contrast Japa-
nese dynamism with America's seeming inactivity, footage is shown
from the Battle of the Bands that took place at Pearl Harbor's Bloch
Arena the night of December 6; and the story is told of how the Ari-
zona's band had come in second, thereby winning the right to sleep
late the next morning.8 The narrator sums up the situation by saying,
"Pearl Harbor slept."
In reality, of course, the military was far from asleep. The problem
was not its state of readiness, but its failure to perceive where the dan-
ger lay. The difference between naive innocence and misjudging a
threatening situation can hardly be overstated. The latter assessment
is actually attested to in the footage that follows, but not in a way that
contradicts the earlier impression of innocent slumber. The destroyer
Ward had detected and fired upon one of the midget submarines
Japan had in the area and reported doing so almost an hour before
the bombing. Japanese planes were picked up on U.S. radar, but
(mis) identified as a flight of B-17S due in from the mainland that
morning. Fatal strategic choices made by the U.S. military are entirely
omitted from the Navy film and will be analyzed below in connection
with the NPS film where they are noted.
The footage of the attack is vivid, much of it courtesy of Hollywood
re-creations. Hence, unlike the National Park Service film which uti-
lizes authentic footage almost exclusively, the Navy film shows Ameri-
can servicemen scrambling to respond. No one inside a battleship on
that morning would have paused to shoot such footage (or survive if
he had), but the Navy film's audience is never alerted to that fact.
After almost three minutes of battle scenes, the male narrator returns
to tally the losses: so many ships, so many "Navy men and Marines"
dead and wounded. No mention is made of the attack on O'ahu's
other bases, of Army casualties, civilian casualties, or Japanese casual-
ties for that matter. The attack is arbitrarily limited to the confines of
Pearl Harbor, making the story the Navy's to tell.
In sharp contrast to the film's earlier portrayal of passivity and resul-
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tant devastation, the salvage and recovery operations are described as
follows: "Like the mythical phoenix, the Pacific Fleet returned to fight
again. The cry 'Remember Pearl Harbor' rallied Americans every-
where." Having awakened at last, "hundreds of civilian technicians"
joined Navy personnel to work "around the clock" at repairing the
damage. The result "would stand forever as one of the greatest
achievements in maritime history."9 Paralleling the earlier recitation
of Japanese military actions in Asia and the Pacific, a litany of succes-
sive American victories is reeled off. As Geoffrey White10 has noted,
the list concludes with Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Japan, omitting men-
tion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After footage of the signing of the
surrender documents on board the Missouri, the music comes up,
marking the return to the underwater grave of the Arizona. As viewers
look at the memorial designed by architect Alfred Preis and the wall
of names contained within it, the film concludes with these words:
If we forget December 7, 1941; if we forget over 1,000 men still
entombed aboard USS Arizona; if we forget that a nation unprepared
will sacrifice many of her finest men and women, then we would forget
what America stands for and that is why we must remember Pearl Har-
bor. Homeport still for one of the world's most powerful Naval forces,
the United States Pacific Fleet.
To summarize what has been presented thus far, the Navy film is
precisely that: the story of Pearl Harbor told from the Navy perspec-
tive. It is not unlike a military briefing: full of maps, facts, and figures;
short on sentiment—with the dramatic exception of the whispered
names so loved by the audience; and structured by sharply drawn con-
trasts between "us" and "them." Interestingly, these designations could
almost as readily refer to "military" and "civilian" (or, more precisely,
"Washington officials") as "the U.S." and "Japan." At no time prior
to mobilization are American leaders portrayed as particularly capa-
ble, much less "brilliant." U.S. military officers, when mentioned by
name, are reported as killed in the line of duty. As such, they become
candidates for martyrdom, not recrimination. Perhaps this is what
the film's audiences (unconsciously) objected to; i.e., not the profes-
sional recognition accorded the Japanese by their U.S. counterparts,
but the contrasting and unrelieved portrayal of Americans as sleep-
ing, oblivious or, having paid the price for their shortcomings, dead.
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What aim would be served by the Navy's presenting such a picture?
I suggest the stark contrast made it easier for the Navy to present and
argue its case in black-and-white terms: public support of the military
equals survival; denial equals disaster. In the post-Vietnam era of the
Cold War, the 1980 film would have been a useful tool for garnering
civilian favor, as well as a not-so-subtle reminder to officialdom about
who it is that pays the price for political decisions. The film concludes
by showing that the best defense (i.e., the one that eventually won the
war) is the civilian sector working with (for) the military to overwhelm
the enemy technologically. If war does not appear imminent, that is
all the more reason to remain vigilant. The only alternative envisioned
by the film is the whispered names of those at rest in the sunken ship.
Thus, the film's usage of the slogan "Remember Pearl Harbor" has
both memorializing and proselytizing functions.
THE CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE:
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE FILM
The NPS film tells the same story, but it has been "civilianized" to
include the American public. The 1992 film aims at preparing visi-
tors, intellectually and emotionally, for their visit to the memorial.11
Many visitors consider the Vietnam War ancient history, much less
Pearl Harbor and World War II. Therefore, urging them to remem-
ber something of which they have no memory is seen as futile and self-
defeating. The National Park Service film provides more diplomatic
history than does the Navy film; its version includes other branches
of the service; it relies almost exclusively on authentic footage and
photographs; it does not hesitate to name emotions; and it therefore
concludes on a very different note, evoking a more subtle range of
responses from the audience. The use of a female narrator (actress
Stockard Channing) immediately alerts the audience not to expect a
gung-ho, John Wayne-style presentation. In contrast to the Navy film's
emphasis on imminent attack and eternal vigilance, the National
Park Service film uses an historical approach that provides perspec-
tive on the events that took place more than a half-century ago. As a
result, viewers are given a sweeping, Olympian view which allows them
both to see what did happen and to imagine what might have tran-
spired had different choices been made.
72 THE HAWAIIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY
However, such a perspective also presents the filmmakers with two
problems: making the film relevant to younger viewers and compress-
ing considerable historical material into the twenty-three minutes
allotted the film portion of the visitor program. The first problem is
solved by engaging the viewer's emotions and imagination; e.g., what
would I have done? The solution is due in no small part to Channing's
talented reading of the script. The challenge of time constraints is
handled by showing Movietone News footage. Viewers see what audi-
ences of the 1930s saw. They absorb the information being presented
while maintaining historical perspective on the events given Movie-
tone's dated style of delivery, poor sound quality, and melodramatic
musical score. The hard-driving narration stands in strong contrast to
Channing's richly textured delivery. Movietone's dramatic presenta-
tion is thus tempered by Channing's measured telling of the events'
aftermath. Like the Navy film, the National Park Service film includes
some background on the USS Arizona. However, instead of beginning
the film with the ship and leading up to its assignment at Pearl Har-
bor, the NPS film begins with events in the Pacific, discusses the U.S.
response, including military preparations, and then narrows its focus
to the ship. Rather than relate the Arizona's service history, the film
"civilianizes" the ship by describing it as "a small city gone to sea."
By assuming a noncombatant perspective, the film situates itself
above the fray by showing the various parties at work: the Japanese,
the Americans, the U.S. government in Washington, the U.S. military
in Hawai'i, the Army, the Navy. Such a stance also enables the film to
portray events as the result of lapses in judgment and the misinter-
pretation of data, rather than the seemingly willful oblivion empha-
sized in the Navy film. Both films cover the same ground and relate
many of the same details. But the Navy film gives a sense of inevitabil-
ity to its telling of the story: this is what one can expect when a nation
goes unprepared. The National Park Service film offers no lessons,
treating the events as unique and implicitly encouraging the audience
to imagine alternate scenarios (e.g., what if the radar operator who
spotted the Japanese planes had not been told, "Don't worry about
it"). In short, by demonstrating the complexity of the situation, the
NPS narrative makes viewers aware of what alternatives existed, which
decisions were made, and how orders were carried out. The film foot-
age shown of Roosevelt, Hull, Japanese diplomats, and others does
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not convey a picture of inactivity or a state of ease. One does not get
the impression that the United States was so politically naive as to
"hope the whole business would go away." Militarily, no one was
asleep; everyone did what he thought best, based on tragically wrong
assumptions. The fact that these choices appeared plausible at the
time gives them their tragic quality.
Perhaps unexpectedly, the National Park Service film more fully
describes the military in Hawai'i prior to the attack than did the Navy
film. In so doing, the difference in perspective between the two films
is most clearly seen. The NPS film states "The American military knew
that a surprise Japanese attack on Hawai'i was possible, and they
thought they were prepared." It describes O'ahu's fortifications and
the fleet's preparing for war with weekly exercises. It notes that the
bombers based at Hickam Field were capable of reaching an enemy
fleet far out at sea. How could such a seemingly invincible force be
caught so flat-footed? As the audience comes to realize, weapons in
themselves are not everything; they must be properly targeted. The
film continues: believing that the greatest danger was not from a Japa-
nese air attack but from saboteurs within Hawai'i's large Japanese
population, the Army's General Short ordered that aircraft be parked
wing-tip to wing-tip, in the center of the airfields so they could be
guarded more easily against local residents. Their guns unloaded, the
planes were easy targets. Their destruction throughout O'ahu left the
Navy completely vulnerable to air attack at Pearl Harbor. The accom-
panying footage, an aerial view of the parked planes, shows just how
easy it was. One frequently hears gasps and groans from the audience
as it grasps that fact. When presented with this element of the story,
one better understands why the Navy chose to relate its version the
way it did: better to claim innocence and imply being hampered by
short-sighted officials than to admit the military's role in its own
defeat or the racist assumptions behind its strategy.
The NPS film moves from the aerial view of the airfield to the Ari-
zona at anchor at night with "Moonlight Serenade" playing in the
background. There are just a few shots of Hawai'i's beaches, palms,
and a hula dancer; but one does sense that there were also civilians liv-
ing in the islands whose lives would be changed forever by the attack.
The attack itself is conveyed with archival footage and still photos. It
gives the impression of devastation without being graphic or gory.
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Here no music is used. Instead, the audio track is filled with the sound
of explosions, engines, sirens, and the crackle of fire. Unlike the Navy
film, ten ships are cited in addition to the Arizona and the damage
they sustained is recounted. Also unlike the Navy film, no mention is
made of commanding officers who were killed in the attack. Despite
being pressured to include them, National Park Service personnel
felt all casualties should be treated equally and no one should be sin-
gled out for recognition.12 Thus, in the enumeration of the dead and
wounded, "sailors, airmen, marines, soldiers, and civilians" are all
included. Then the Japanese losses are given. Rather than shifting
immediately to salvage efforts as did the Navy film, the NPS film shows
the response of the U.S. government and the American people: FDR's
"date in infamy" speech is followed by scenes of young men enlisting
and children watching a military parade. Thus, society is shown being
mobilized, not just technicians. Here and only here is the phrase
"remember Pearl Harbor" used, and it is heard in the form of the
song "Let's Remember Pearl Harbor."
Having shown a mobilized and united America, the film devotes
two sentences to the salvage effort, then turns to the war in the Pacific.
Given that the memorial's interpretive mission limits it to events
immediately relevant to the attack, the story of the war is very quickly
told. Ships which met (or just missed meeting) at Pearl Harbor, meet
again at Midway where "the tide of the war turned." Unlike the Navy's
film, military victories are not listed, nor is the surrender mentioned.
Rather, the screen goes completely blank for a few seconds—long
enough to make the audience conscious of its surroundings. Then
the film returns with contemporary color footage of the harbor and
the memorial, preparing viewers for what they will soon experience
for themselves. Here is the final example of the film's civilian perspec-
tive. While the remembrance ritual shown in the Navy film is limited
to Naval personnel (specifically, a close-up of a teary-eyed sailor), the
National Park Service film shows the annual December 7 remem-
brance ceremonies which are held at the Arizona Memorial Visitor
Center. American and Japanese participants draw a slip of paper
bearing the name of a deceased serviceman and remember him indi-
vidually. Not only does the film open up remembrance rituals to
American civilians and foreigners, it also lets its audience know non-
Americans are welcome to visit the memorial. The film closes by ask-
ing*
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How shall we remember them, those who died? Mourn the dead.
Remember the battle. Understand the tragedy. Honor the memory.
Let our grief for the men of Arizona be for all those whose futures were
taken from them on December 7th, 1941. Here they will never be for-
gotten.
Thus, the film concludes on a very different note than does the
Navy film. As stated by the memorial's (former) superintendent, Don-
ald Magee, "Patriotic groups wanted to use the theme that we always
need to be prepared so this doesn't happen again. And that was not
our theme . . . I said, 'That's a military theme. That's not what a
memorial is about.' How do we remember? We thought about that
all along."13 To quote filmmaker Lance Bird, "What really mattered
was how do you feel about all this when the lights go up? . . . [We] try
to quiet them down and let them know that they're going to do some-
thing unusual, that may have an emotional effect on them."14 How
does the audience respond? A few write to complain that the film pan-
ders to the Japanese. Their comments are balanced by those who
complain the presentation is too pro-American. Many visitors feel
emotions with an intensity that surprises them: grief, patriotic pride,
and a sense of serenity once they are on the memorial itself out in the
harbor. For the audience of this film, remembering Pearl Harbor is
not about eternal vigilance, but about the futility of war, the brevity
of life, and the need to work for peace.
THE RESIDENT PERSPECTIVE: THE ORAL HISTORIES
In October of 1990, National Park Service personnel approached the
Center for Oral History at the University of Hawai'i about undertak-
ing an oral history project to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of
the Pearl Harbor attack. The 33 people who were eventually inter-
viewed about their memories of the war years in Hawai'i were chosen
on the basis of their ethnic diversity and representative lifestyles.
Some were Caucasian (both from the mainland and Hawai'i-born),
some were Japanese-American, others were of African-American,
Chinese, Korean, Okinawan, Filipino, Samoan, or Hawaiian descent.
Many were the children of immigrants; a few were foreign-born
Italians and Japanese and thus interned during the war. Few were
older than their twenties in 1941. Some remembered the period as
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exciting and fun; for others it was a time of hardship, uncertainty,
and fear. Some saw opportunity and profited from the unprece-
dented influx of men and materiel; others had their property seized
and suffered severe losses. Some later served in the military; more
were employed as civilian workers; one was a pacifist; none escaped
untouched.
A formal interview schedule was not used; therefore, the same sub-
jects were not covered by all participants. While the reader may regret
certain follow-up questions not being asked or an occasional failure
to probe more deeply, the 1,782-page transcript certainly provides a
vivid picture of life in Hawai'i during World War II. However, the
focus here will be limited to material that pertains to the two films'
divergent presentations of why the defeat occurred; namely, the issue
of military preparedness and, consequently, military-civilian relations
in Hawai'i in general and their racist nature in particular. As men-
tioned previously, the NPS film depicts U.S. vulnerability at Pearl Har-
bor as the result of the strategic decision to classify the largely rural
Japanese population as a greater security threat than the Japanese mil-
itary. To explain why this should be so, I draw on Gary Okihiro's Cane
Fire15 for background on attitudes toward the Japanese, whether aliens
or U.S. citizens, living in Hawai'i.
Japanese immigrants arrived in Honolulu in large numbers to work
in the sugarcane fields after 1885. As a result of a strike by sugar work-
ers in 1920, the white American oligarchy that controlled Hawai'i
sought to replace the predominantly Japanese laborers with other
Asians. To do so, it was necessary to change U.S. immigration law. To
bolster their case in testifying before Congress about the law, the
planters portrayed the conflict not as labor strife but as an expression
of Japanese nationalism. While the law remained unchanged, the
commission set up to look into the matter identified Hawai'i's prob-
lem as "the menace of alien domination" which threatened to "sweep
everything American from the Islands."16 Given the U.S. military's
long-standing interest in Pearl Harbor and the triangular equation
drawn between Hawai'i's economic prosperity, political stability, and
white American elite, military interests and sugar interests coincided.
On January 15, 1921, the U.S. Secretary of War approved a defense
plan for O'ahu that included martial law and the internment of enemy
aliens. In 1929, the Military Intelligence Division proposed classify-
ing both Japanese aliens and their American-born children as enemy
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aliens. In 1932, Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham went so far as
to introduce a bill to replace Hawai'i's territorial government with
control by the Navy and a governing commission on the grounds that
American democracy was ill-equipped to deal with the Japanese men-
ace.17 (By then the oligarchy feared being overthrown via the ballot
box.) As Okihiro concludes, "Pearl Harbor merely triggered the gun
loading of the previous two decades, or, more correctly, of the anti-
Japanese movement that spanned the entire range of a people's his-
tory, from plantation to concentration camp."18 While one would not
expect material of this detail to be part of the visitor center films, it
certainly provides perspective on why American planes were being
guarded in the middle of airfields.
If the military was dismissive of the sighting of enemy submarines
and the radar detection of Japanese planes, the local populace was
even less mindful of the possibility of an attack. Residents heard the
planes and explosions but went calmly about their business, con-
vinced the noise was the result of routine military maneuvers. Far
from being unprepared and asleep, the U.S. military had drilled so
frequently and intensely that Hawai'i's civilian populace could not tell
the difference between practice and the real thing. One woman who
was a secretary at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard in 1941 described
her memory of the attack as follows. She had planned to go swimming
with a Naval officer the morning of December 7. She telephoned him
to confirm and, hearing the noise from her apartment in Waikikl,
asked what was going on. He said he did not know, but would get back
to her. She then turned on the radio and learned it was an attack. No
one was to go out or use the telephone, and doctors were to report for
duty. Her roommate, who had been in the shower, did not believe the
news, dismissed the noise as "army maneuvers," and drove off to meet
friends. Over breakfast her Chinese guests remarked on the din, say-
ing, "If we weren't in Hawai'i, we'd think a war was going on." The
roommate returned to Waikikl almost three hours after the attack
began, still unaware that anything was amiss.19
One finds this reaction over and over in the transcripts: disbelief
based on knowledge of prior U.S. military activity. As one eyewitness
told it, "Every Sunday morning for weeks and weeks the military had
had practice with all kinds of bombs going off all around, boats at sea
shelling. And you would think it was a war then. So when the Japanese
airplanes were bombing Pearl Harbor, we just thought it's another
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exercise. Almost everybody did."20 Those who learned about the war
from the radio were the lucky ones. Some of the interviewees lived or
worked in the path of the bombers and saw the planes firsthand. The
daughter of Korean immigrants, Agnes Chun went to sleep the night
of December 6 exhausted from her first day on the job as a cashier at
S. H. Kress and Company. At 16, she was proud of the $1.90 she had
earned for those eight hours of work. She was still in bed when she
heard the planes the next morning.
I heard commotion outside, and I got up. When I went out, they said,
"Oh, the war. There's a war." There's planes flying around and when I
looked up, we saw a plane flying, and it was with the round red circle.
So we ran inside and as we were listening to the radio, about 9, 9:30,
we heard this thud-like (sound) . . . [In a building across the lane] right
under the veranda, there was a huge hole. We all ran and were look-
ing at the hole . . . [when] some kind of uniformed people (came) run-
ning. They told us to evacuate. So the whole neighborhood had to
evacuate...
[They spent the night in a house that had just been constructed by
in-laws but was not yet occupied.] From there we looked towards Pearl
Harbor, (and saw) the smoke coming u p . . . We were all scared, and
especially at night when they told us all the lights had to be out.21
For island residents, the next step was not the salvage and rebuild-
ing sequence presented in the films, but the complete disruption of
their lives under martial law.22 Interviewees related stories of curfews,
black-outs, and long evenings with nothing to do but get on each
other's nerves. Gas and alcohol were rationed, schools were closed,
and the military commandeered whatever it needed: land, housing,
equipment, businesses. Prices were frozen and so were jobs. People
were fingerprinted, registered, and given identity badges to wear.
Some individuals were assigned jobs without benefit of training.
Having arrived on December 3, 1941 to play a football game in
Hawai'i, Paul Tognetti stated, "We didn't even know what Hawai'i was.
And when we got here, during December 7, O'ahu was being bombed
and we asked each other, 'What's O'ahu?'" By December 8, he and
his San Jose State teammates were military police defending O'ahu.
They had been asked to work at the police station and agreed to do
so rather than sit around the hotel wondering what was going to hap-
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pen. They were given military police arm bands, 1918 steel helmets,
and riot guns; then sent out on patrol to guard 'A'ala Park against
invasion by paratroopers. To quote Tognetti, "So I was there with my
little riot gun and hoped nothing would come in. And martial law was
declared. Everybody had to be off the streets. And the marines were
on the waterfront, and anything that moved, their machine guns went
all night." 23
Neither the Navy nor the National Park Service film mentions that
most of the damage done on O'ahu away from U.S. military installa-
tions was caused by friendly fire: anti-aircraft shells that missed their
target (although park rangers are quick to mention this fact in their
talks on the subject). However, few realized this at the time and the
islands were rife with rumors of a Japanese invasion. As time passed
and fear receded, members of the business community chafed under
the many military restrictions, especially those made in the heat of the
moment without thought as to consequence. For those servicing the
military, it was a time of economic boom. A number of interviewees,
especially women, spoke of the job opportunities that came their way
and how much they enjoyed them, economically and socially.24
Others were equally cognizant of tension within families when daugh-
ters became emotionally involved with soldiers who often failed to
return to the islands. Relations between local male civilian workers
and belligerent and/or drunken servicemen sometimes erupted into
violence. Much more often, however, one reads that people just "took
it" because "in those days, what the military did went unchallenged."25
It is interesting that several interviewees specifically mention South-
ern servicemen when speaking of racial attitudes. Ernest Golden, an
African-American from Georgia who came to Hawai'i to escape
Southern racism, speaks very tellingly on race relations in the islands
compared with those on the continent. More representative of the
situation, however, are the experiences of Japanese-American inter-
viewees, many of whom had parents who were still citizens of Japan
at the time of the attack. If other residents of Hawai'i became fearful
after the attack, Americans of Japanese ancestry (AJAs) were anxious
well before and for much longer afterward. They realized they were
under suspicion by the military,26 and they were afraid that one false
step, one careless word, or even a misinterpreted look could trigger
their doom and that of their families. What is disturbing about read-
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ing their accounts is the realization that for many the pain, fear, and
humiliation lasted decades after the war. The short, emphatic
responses given below speak volumes:
Q: How did you feel about the war against Japan?
A: I don't feel nothing at all. And they treat me just the same, so I
never feel nothing at all . . .
Q: Did you think you were more for the Japanese side or for the
American side or did it matter?
A: No, I never feel... I never take side, any side. That part, no, I no ill
feeling against Japan or American or whatever.
Q: What about the other people? The other people in the Japanese
community, the other Japanese neighbors, how did they feel about the
war?
A: I don't know, no. Never ask or.. . .
Q: Were there things like Japanese (-language) newspapers and radio
that you folks had?
A: Japanese newspaper? No, I don't know.
Q: Not over here [i.e., Hilo].
A: No.
[after a break]
Q: How much did you know about what was happening on the other
islands like on O'ahu?
A: No.
Q: No news?
A: No, I don't know.
Q: Did you hear anything about how things were though, on the other
islands?
A: No.
Q: So just mostly only Hilo things?
A: Yeah.
Q: How much did you know about the war and how things were going?
Who was winning and things like that?
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A: Oh, that. Only, you know, whatever you hear on the radio and this
and that. Newspaper. (Other than) that, we do not know.
Q: How did you feel about the war and what was happening?
A: Oh, I don't feel nothing at all. Get war or not. Only thing we feel is
that we cannot go fishing [his occupation], that's all.27
When the topic shifted to fishing, the interviewee answered with a
response that was six times longer than any given answer above. It
appears that while the interviewer was probing for facts and memo-
ries, the interviewee felt he was being interrogated on a subject that
was better left untouched. It is not until well into the exchange that
the interviewee realized that the knowledge base the questioner was
asking about referred to American news media and not contraband
sources of information. Even when family members ask questions
about wartime activities, they are rarely successful in getting people to
talk.28 One woman who was a teenager during the war discussed talk-
ing to her nisei father about life then.
We were surprised, even to this day, he had remembered a lot of things.
He corrected me. And yet, when I question him about anything that
happened after we got evacuated, a lot of things, even if he remembers,
he won't tell me about it. He won't tell me about it. And it seemed as
though he either blocks it out, or he finds the easiest way out [is to say],
"No, I don't remember."
. . . so it must be something—that period of time is very painful.
And either he doesn't want to remember, or he doesn't want to talk
about it. Every now and then, if I bring something up, he would say yes
or no. But especially when I tell him things about Mom's part [she suf-
fered a nervous breakdown] . . . he just won't answer anymore, and I
see tears in his eyes. So it's very painful for him, so I just drop it.
When asked if she herself ever speaks about what happened to her
family during the war, she replied,
After the war, only a very few people knew. It was mostly my supervi-
sors and strangely enough, all of my supervisors were Caucasian peo-
ple. But they were some of the nicest people I have ever m e t . . . So with
my experience with the military ousting us [forced evacuation and per-
manent loss of farmland abutting Pearl Harbor], and yet I got employ-
ment with the military, and there were so many benefits given to me
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through them. Like I say, all of 'em were Caucasians, and they were
really, really nice.29
It is worth noting that for many residents of Hawai'i, the war was
their first opportunity to meet Caucasian-Americans who were from
the working- and middle-classes, rather than the elite. It proved to be
a revelation. If a local Caucasian testified to the reliability of AJAs or
intervened in some way to protect their interests vis-a-vis the military
governor, that act of kindness is still remembered today and the per-
son cited by name.30 Such individual actions stood in sharp contrast
to official policy which, for example, denied an Okinawan woman
access to her husband's body while it was in a hospital mortuary. The
man had been fishing at sea during the attack. The following day his
wife received the news he was at Queen's Hospital; it was unclear if
he was dead or alive.
Security guard was over there all, so they won't let us go in . . . My cou-
sin went down and asked, "Oh, can the wife just see?" And they refused.
You can't go in at that time, everything was restricted . . .
[Her sister-in-law worked for a prominent Caucasian who took her
straight into the hospital mortuary where she could identify her broth-
er's body and confirm his death for the widow.]
Q: So you only got to see your husband when you—when Mr. Richards
came along with you.
A: My sister-in-law went, yeah. That's when I knew he died .. . But at that
time, I didn't know if over here people had killed or Japan plane had
killed . . . I didn't inquire to find out anything about that... at first they
weren't supposed to talk nothing about this.31
More affecting than interviews with internees (who in this collec-
tion speak of the boredom of incarceration and having limited access
to their families32) is the story of Ruth Yamaguchi. Her family lived
poised on ruin for many long months. Her paternal grandmother was
from Japan and had strongly opposed her son, Ruth's father, when he
renounced his Japanese citizenship in 1940. At 14, Ruth was the old-
est daughter still at home and she had to look after three very lively
younger brothers. Her mother was totally absorbed with a sickly baby
and suffered a nervous breakdown after the attack. The family had
just purchased nine acres of farmland adjacent to Pearl Harbor and
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 83
moved into a three-bedroom house on the site in August of 1941.
One morning a few weeks after the attack, they were ordered off their
land before sundown by military officers. Whether the confiscation of
land, home, and furnishings was due to geography or race was not
determined until long afterward. Her family stayed with another Japa-
nese-American family and was, in turn, joined by two more families—
for a total of twenty people living in one tiny house.
Ruth describes her life as a teenager, caring for the younger chil-
dren while her mother became increasingly unstable, her baby
brother faded, and her father exhausted himself working the farm
and also at a salaried job. Afraid to antagonize the officers who lived
in their house or to endanger their neighbors by stopping to visit with
them, the family endured crowded conditions and the bickering of
the four families' children. Ashamed to reveal the family's evacuation
and frantic about her mother's health, Ruth was unable to concen-
trate on school and dropped out to take a job at the army exchange.
The most memorable character in her story, however, is her grand-
mother, a Japanese citizen and literally hysterical about the fact—
not, as one might expect, because she feared American reprisals, but
because she feared Japanese invaders would kill her as a traitor for
living in Hawai'i. She was also convinced that she was the sole cause
of the eviction of her son and his family. Ruth's exhaustion was com-
pounded by having to reason continually with her panicky and guilt-
ridden grandmother. Yet, recalls Ruth,
No matter what the military did to us, Dad did not hold anything
against the U.S. government... all these years [he was] very loyal to
America, regardless of what they did. And I remember one time he did
tell me that... no matter what they did, he felt very fortunate they did
not do anything to Grandma. She was an alien in the family, yet he felt
very fortunate they did not do anything to Grandma, because he heard
of all these different stories, no matter how old they were, they were
taken away and interned.
Summarizing her feelings, Ruth expressed the unresolved conflict
in the situation:
In those days, nobody fought the government, nobody's gonna ques-
tion or stand against the government. No matter even if you're Japa-
nese, if you're born American Japanese, you're very loyal to America. I
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thought (about) my father, when he cut off his citizenship, saying that
he's an American citizen.
And yet I thought about people like my Grandma, where, during the
war, they were persons without a country. She did not belong to Amer-
ica, she did not belong to Japan. And I thought about that, and I could
not help but feel so sorry for people like my Grandma. Whether they
went with Japan, it was wrong, whether they went with America, it was
wrong for them. It must have been emotionally hard for them.
And yet when I think about our situation, there was nobody to stand
up for us. You didn't dare fight the government, you did what you were
told . . . You all had to get out if the government told you. It was not a
case of standing up for your rights . . . People who were interned, every-
body knew about them. But it seemed as though we were part of Ameri-
can history that happened, and yet unknown or forgotten. But to bring
it up fifty years later, it hasn't been easy, because I guess for people my
age, we really remember a lot of things. There's part of our childhood
that we lost.33
Several themes stand out in reviewing the oral histories: the total
upheaval people underwent, the power of the military, and the part
race played in shaping one's experience. It seems the younger one
was at the time of the attack and the less responsibility one had, the
more exhilarating one found the change—unless one was of Japanese
ancestry. People bore up as best they could under the heavy hand of
martial law and quickly became engaged in their wartime occupa-
tions. For many, and especially for women, it meant economic oppor-
tunity and undreamed of career possibilities. However, for AJAs with-
out Caucasian contacts, it was a trying time. Fearful of being identified
as or with the enemy, forbidden to congregate in groups, made vul-
nerable by elderly parents who retained Japanese citizenship,34 their
language forbidden, their land and goods confiscated whenever the
military deemed it necessary, and without any means of redress for a
half-century, Hawai'i's AJAs remained silent. The silence engendered
by fear and later by humiliation was compounded by the wartime
need for secrecy. It was not wise to be thought to know too much,
especially if one was not Caucasian. The oral history transcripts docu-
ment that silence and lingering uneasiness, making them all the more
valuable as a complement to the films shown at the Arizona Memorial.
In particular, they are evidence of what else happened that day on
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O'ahu—this time from the perspective of residents: disbelief, chaos,
threat, and challenge.
CONCLUSION
I have analyzed three stories of Pearl Harbor as told from national as
well as from local perspectives. I have examined the official histories
told at the site as well as the personal recollections of those who lived
there. Most particularly, in looking at the thrust of the stories and the
priorities of their presenters, I have compared what was and is being
told with what has been and still is omitted. In focusing on the narra-
tives told by the Navy, the National Park Service, and local residents,
I am mindful that myriad other versions exist.35 However, the films
and oral histories analyzed above were selected for the light they shed
on the creation of public memory by virtue of 1) their sharply con-
trasting perspectives and 2) the legitimacy they are accorded given
their firsthand association with the site. Even if one compares only the
films, one is struck by the difference in perspective, aim, and impact.
Yet neither film deemed it necessary to allude to those who lived on
the land surrounding the harbor at the time of the attack. Perhaps it
was thought that a superficial reference to such a complicated and
sensitive issue would be worse than no mention at all. However,
silence on the subject has meant that few local residents relate per-
sonally to the memorial. Some feel hesitant to visit, still unsure of
their welcome. In response, the National Park Service has instituted
special programming for residents in recent years, including ranger
presentations on civilian life during the war.
How do the three stories differ and with what effect on their audi-
ences? In the Navy version, initial military defeat culminates in ulti-
mate victory and the admonition to be eternally vigilant. Presumably,
audiences were meant to leave the theater in a patriotic, determined
frame of mind. The National Park Service film prepares its viewers for
their visit to the memorial by balancing a national historical perspec-
tive with a personal sense of loss. As a result, visitors often describe
themselves as experiencing both serenity and grief while viewing the
Arizona from the memorial, the latter straddling the barely visible ship
where it sank in the harbor. The stories of Pearl Harbor's wartime res-
idents vary widely, but there are common threads in the descriptions
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of life disrupted by a drastically changed world. Not just military lives
were lost at Pearl Harbor, but a collective way of life that had devel-
oped in the islands. The threat to peace was not just external in ori-
gin but internal in the form of racism.
While the individual stories of change and personal suffering may
not be part of the national canon of collective memory concerning
the attack, they are significant for their insight and provide an emo-
tional counterpoint to the stories of death and military bravery. Some-
times the greatest challenge lies in just carrying on. This was true of
no group more than AJAs, and their tradition has been to carry on
in silence. As an explanation for this silence, I refer to Jacob Climo's
analysis36 of the motives of holocaust survivors: a desire to shield one's
family members from direct knowledge of a painful past, an inability
to voice the humiliation and grief, and a desire to establish balance
and control in one's life. As was suggested earlier, for some, fear is still
present—not the fear of death or imprisonment, but the fear of start-
ing trouble and/or being forced to endure further humiliation by
having one's identity or loyalty questioned. Why activate racial preju-
dice?
Lastly, there is the desire to forget those aspects of life that no
longer fit one's image, especially if a great deal has been sacrificed to
achieve that identity. This, of course, is the case with the AJAs who
chose to demonstrate their loyalty during World War II byjoining the
military and serving with distinction—particularly in the legendary
100th Battalion. These individuals returned home determined to
implement the change they felt they had paid for in advance with
blood and tears. When stories from the World War II era are told, as
they increasingly are, the focus is on military service not the intern-
ment camps. The emphasis is on experiences held in common with
other (non-Asian) Americans rather than the role of internee which
was socially unacceptable, psychologically painful, and politically dis-
advantageous. Since the preferred image must be acknowledged by
others for closure to be complete,37 this is the story that is presented
for outside consumption. But in certain contexts, when it is safe to do
so, bits of other experiences are also revealed—reluctantly, painfully,
and haltingly—as each side approaches the other to reach under-
standing.
This analysis has sought to compare the content, aims, and impact
of on-site accounts of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as to explore
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how these narratives are shaped by the silences of official omission,
cultural reticence, and/or personal reluctance. The subtexts of mili-
tary might, uneasy political relations, and racial tension—when spo-
ken of at all—are still handled gingerly, not openly or candidly
explored. If the Pearl Harbor narratives are a classic example of how
collective memory reflects mainstream civic culture while popular
memory offers radically different perspectives, it is also true that sen-
sitivity on the subject has increased. In 2000, the National Park Ser-
vice digitally altered footage in its orientation film at the insistence of
Japanese-Americans who felt a scene with a Japanese fieldworker
implied that some members of their community had been subversive.
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